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ABSTRACT
Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems
is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated
by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common
resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential
games. We use the Bayesian optimization framework to obtain
novel algorithms to solve nite (discrete action spaces) and
innite (real interval action spaces) potential games, utilizing
the structure of potential games. Numerical results illustrate
the eciency of the approach in computing the Nash equilibria
of static potential games and linear Nash equilibria of dynamic
potential games.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modeling strategic behavior in multi-agent systems using
game theory has a rich history. Applications of game the-
ory include a wide range of economic phenomena such as
auctions [17], oligopolies, social network formation [15], be-
havioral economics and political economics; just to name a few.
e most common solution concept used to analyze the out-
come of such a strategic interaction is the Nash equilibrium. In
a Nash equilibrium, no player benets by deviating from their
strategy [24]. In general, the Nash equilibrium is found as the
xed point solution of multiple single optimization problems.
Potential games are an important class of games rst dened
in [29] and later popularized by [20]; refer to [9] for a recent
survey. e key property of potential games is the existence of
a function, called the potential function, such that optimizing
the potential function gives the Nash equilibrium. Potential
games have been extensively used in the context of exploita-
tion of common economic resource, such as in mining and
shing; see, for example, the survey [32]. Potential games are
a natural model when the benets that a player derives from
the use of a facility is proportional to the total number of users
of the same facility. An important class of potential games is
that of congestion games [36], widely used for understanding
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Figure 1: Example of a game with a black box utility function: Se-
cure cloud computing. Each ‘secure’ agent is unwilling to disclose its
private utility function. e system operator is only able to compute
the equilibria using the realized values of the private utility functions.
road transportation in urban areas [4] and inuence in social
networks [14]. In the context of decision making under un-
certainty and risk, [3] proposed potential games as a model
for interdependent preference. In addition, potential games
nds use in power control in wireless network [10, 31] and
cognitive radio network [21].
ere is an extensive literature on the techniques and algo-
rithms for computing Nash equilibria of games, including
potential games; see for example [2]. However, very lile is
known about computing Nash equilibria of ‘black box’ utility
function or ‘expensive to evaluate’ utility functions. [18] gives
the example of a secure cloud computing system as shown in
Figure 1. Each ‘secure’ agent is unwilling to disclose its private
utility function. e system operator is only able to compute
the equilibrium using the realized values of the private utility
functions. Other examples include extraction of economic
resource such as water or mining where a regulator, which
takes into account strategic interaction between players, have
some control over the actions of the players. To the best of
our knowledge, only [25] address this problem for general
games. However, several problems of exploitation of common
resources, such as the cloud computing problem in [18] (Fig-
ure 1), can be modeled using potential games. Hence, in this
paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria
of potential games with ‘black box’ utility functions.
Main results and Organization: Section 2.1 provides a brief
introduction to potential games and their important proper-
ties. Gaussian processes [28] are a powerful, non-parametric
Bayesian approach of learning and optimizing unknown func-
tions eciently. Section 2.2 summarizes important results
from Gaussian process regression, the framework adopted in
this paper. Since potential games are characterized by a poten-
tial function, we impose a Gaussian process on the unknown
potential function. e key dierence between the above for-
mulation to the standard Gaussian process regression in [28]
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and the formulation for general games in [25] is that the func-
tion (the potential in this case), on which the Gaussian process
is imposed, is not directly observed. However, the utility of
each player, which is related to the potential function, can
be measured; commonly referred to as bandit feedback in the
potential game literature [11].
is paper has the following main results: (i) Section 3 derives
an algorithm (Algorithm 1) for eciently computing the Nash
equilibrium of potential games with nite action sets, with
‘black box’ utility functions. (ii) Similarly, Section 4 derives an
algorithm (Algorithm 2) to compute the Nash equilibria for
potential games with continuous action sets. When action sets
are continuous, bandit feedback provides noisy integral of the
gradients of potential function; see (5). Algorithm 2 presents
a method which simultaneously estimates the gradient (from
bandit feedback) and optimizes the unknown function using
Gaussian processes. (iii) Section 5 presents numerical results
illustrating the eciency of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in
computing the Nash equilibrium of static games and linear
Nash equilibrium of dynamic potential games, compared to
existing techniques. Concluding remarks are oered in Sec-
tion 6.
Context and Related Literature: e problem considered in
this paper (see, for example, Figure 1) can be compared to
the no-regret learning framework in classical game theory.
In no-regret learning, each player, simultaneously, chooses a
mixed strategy (a distribution over the action set) and obtains
a pay-o associated with the strategy. e players keep a
‘score’ based on the obtained pay-o. e mixed strategy is
chosen based on the score; the most popular method being the
exponential or the multiplicative weight algorithm [30]. In the
context of potential games [11] and [5] show that the expo-
nential weight algorithm converges to the Nash equilibrium
with bandit feedback.
Inferring the unknown utilities of agents has a rich history
in the revealed preference literature [35] in micro-economics.
e revealed preference framework has been extended to the
case of multiagent systems in the context of potential games
in [6, 13]. However, in comparison, this paper considers the
problem of computing the Nash equilibrium, rather than char-
acterizing the utility functions.
Notation: In this paper, vectors are denoted by lower case
leers, e.g., x , while matrices are denoted by upper case leers,
e.g., K . For a vector x , xᵀ denotes its transpose, while for a
function f , f ′ denotes its derivative. e players are indexed
by i and j, and k and l denote sequence indices. For a vector
x , the ith component (usually, corresponding to a player) is
denoted (in subscript) by xi . However, the sequence index is
given in the superscript, e.g., xk . Time is denoted by t . Finally,
the symbol ∼ is used to mean ‘distributed as’.
2 PRELIMINARIES
We introduce potential games in Sec. 2.1 and summarize the
Gaussian process regression results in Sec. 2.2.
2.1 Potential Games
Consider a game with nite number of players1. e set of
players is denoted by I = {1, 2, · · · , I }. Player i chooses an
action from Xi , the possible set of actions for player i . Let
x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xI ) denotes the actions of all the players. e
utility function (or payo) of player i as a function of actions
taken by all the players is given by ui : X 7→ IR, where IR
denotes the real line, and X = X1 × X2 × · · ·XI . e objective
of each player is to maximize its utility function and is given
by
x∗i = maxxi ∈Xi
ui (x), (1)
In the following, we will denote x = (xi ,x−i ), where x−i
denotes the actions of all players other than player i . A popular
concept to analyze the solution of such a strategic game is the
Nash equilibrium. A solution x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if
x∗i = argmax
xi ∈Xi
ui (xi ,x∗−i ) ∀i, (2)
i.e. no player benets by deviating from x∗.
Definition 1 ([20]). A game is called a potential game if there
exists a function Φ : X 7→ IR, called the potential function, such
that
ui (y,x−i )−ui (z,x−i ) = Φ(y,x−i )−Φ(z,x−i ) ∀y, z ∈ Xi . (3)
A nite potential game (potential game with nite action sets)
has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium [20], i.e. a solution exists
for (2). Another important property of potential games is the
existence of a Finite Improvement Path (FIP) [20]. A path is a
sequence of actions
(
x1,x2, . . . ,xk , . . .
)
such that, for some
player i , xk =
(
y,xk−1−i
)
; player i is referred to as the unique
deviator at k . Given a path, the unique deviator at k can be
dened as:
〈k〉 =
{
i ∈ I :
(
xk−i = x
k−1
−i
)
&
(
xki , x
k−1
i
)}
. (4)
A path is called an improvement path ifui (xk ) ≥ ui (xk−1); i =
〈k〉, ∀k . e FIP property for nite potential games states that
every such improvement path is nite2.
Innite Potential game: e following lemma gives the equiva-
lent denition of potential function for potential games with
continuous action sets.
Lemma 1 ( [20]). Consider a game where the action sets are
intervals of real numbers. Suppose, the utility function ui :
X 7→ IR is bounded and continuously dierentiable and let Φ :
X 7→ IR. en, Φ is a potential if and only if Φ is continuously
dierentiable, and
∂ui
∂xi
=
∂Φ
∂xi
∀x . (5)
Similar to the FIP property of nite games, innite potential
games have an approximate nite improvement property [20].
1In this paper, we consider potential games with only nite number of players.
Population games are potential games with innite number of players, or rather a
distribution of players. Extension of the results to population games is ongoing.
2FIP property implies that the Nash equilibrium of a potential game can be
achieved by using a myopic policy in nite time.
2
2.2 Gaussian Processes
A Gaussian process f indexed by X is a stochastic process
such that for every nite collection x1,x2, · · · ,xN ∈ X , f¯ =(
f (x1), f (x2), · · · , f (xN )
)
is a Gaussian random vector [28].
e advantage of a Gaussian process is that it is completely
specied by the mean and the covariance functions dened as
follows:
µ(x) = E[f (x)], κ(x , x¯) = E [(x − µ(x))(x¯ − µ(x¯))ᵀ] . (6)
e mean and covariance function (and associated hyper-
parameters) encode our prior information about the model.
Hence, we denote the Gaussian process by f ∼ GP (µ,κ).
Let, x =
(
x1,x2, · · · ,xN
)
, µ =
(
µ(x1), µ(x2), · · · , µ(xN )
)
, and
K be a N × N matrix such that Km,n = κ(xm ,xn ). It can be
seen from (6) that f¯ is Gaussian distributed with mean µ and
covariance matrix K , i.e. f¯ ∼ N(µ,K). For any x∗, the predic-
tive distribution is Gaussian, i.e. f (x∗)|{x∗, f¯ ,x} ∼ N(µ∗,σ 2∗ )
with mean and variance given by:
µ∗ = µ∗ + Kᵀ∗ K−1(f − µ) σ 2∗ = K∗∗ − Kᵀ∗ K−1K∗, (7)
where, µ∗ = µ(x∗), K∗(n) = κ(xn ,x∗) and K∗∗ = κ(x∗,x∗).
An important property is that any ane transformation of
a Gaussian process is also a Gaussian process. In particular,
in this paper, we are interested in dierential and integral
operators. Hence, the prior mean over ∂ f /∂xi is given by
µDi = ∂µ/∂xi , and the covariance function is given by
κ
(D,D)
i, j (x , x¯) = cov
[
∂ f (x)
∂xi
,
∂ f (x¯)
∂x j
]
=
∂2κ
∂xi∂x j
(8)
In addition, the covariance function between the function and
its derivative is given by
κDi (x , x¯) = cov
[
f (x), ∂ f (x¯)
∂xi
]
=
∂κ
∂xi
(9)
e integral operator will be introduced in Sec. 4.
3 NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR FINITE
POTENTIAL GAMES
Since potential games are characterized by the potential func-
tion, we use a Gaussian Process model for the potential func-
tion, i.e.
Φ ∼ GP (µ,κ) . (10)
e utility function of each player is measured as below:
yki = ui (xk ) + εi,k , (11)
where εi,k is zero mean white Gaussian noise with variance
ν2, i.e. εi,k ∼ N(0,ν2).
Motivated by the FIP property, we propose the following se-
quential strategy for computing the Nash equilibrium. Let
xk−1 be the current action in the path. Consider all possible
actions x that dier only in the action of player from xk−1
i.e. x ∈ Xk−1FIP =
{
x :
(
x−i = xk−1−i
)
&
(
xi , xk−1i
)}
. For com-
puting the next action in the path, we would have chosen an
action that improves the utility of player 〈x ,xk−1〉, where with
an abuse of notation 〈x ,xk−1〉 denotes the unique deviator
between x and xk−1 as in (4). However, since the unknown
potential function (and hence the utility function) is modeled
using a random function, we will use the following one-step
lookahead criterion [23]. e one-step lookahead criterion
automatically promotes trade-o between exploration and
exploitation; see discussion in [23]. e one-step lookahead
criterion is very similar to the classical expected improvement
criterion [16].
e one-step lookahead criterion selecting the action that
maximizes the following ‘utility function’
η(x) = argmax
x ∈X k−1FIP :〈x,xk−1 〉=i
E
[
ui (x) − ui (xk−1)
]
+
, (12)
where, [x]+ = max {x , 0}. However, from the denition of
potential games in (3),
ui (x) − ui (xk−1) = Φ(x) − Φ(xk−1).
Dene, Z = Φ(x) − Φ(xk−1) and
Φ˜ =
(
Φ(x1),Φ(x2), · · · ,Φ(xk−1),Φ(xk = x)
)
,
∆U =
(
∆u 〈1〉 ,∆u 〈2〉 , · · · ,∆u 〈k−1〉
)
,
∆Y =
(
∆y 〈1〉 ,∆y 〈2〉 , · · · ,∆y 〈k−1〉
)
,
(13)
where, ∆u 〈k 〉 = uk〈k 〉 − uk−1〈k 〉 , and ∆y 〈k 〉 = yk〈k 〉 − yk−1〈k 〉 . Since
the potential function is modeled as a Gaussian process in (10),
Φ˜ is Gaussian, i.e. Φ˜ ∼ N(µ,K), with mean µ(k) = µ(xk ), and
covariance K(k, l) = κ(xk ,x l ). Hence,
BΦ˜ =
(
∆U
Z
)
∼ N (µ¯ = Bµ, K¯ = BKBᵀ) , (14)
where, B is the dierencing matrix given by
B(i, j) =

−1 j = i
1 j = i + 1
0 else.
Consider the partition of the mean and the covariance matrix
in (14) as below:
µ¯ =
[
µ¯1
(k−1)
µ¯2
1
]
, K¯ =

K¯1,1
(k−1)×(k−1)
K¯1,2
(k−1)×1
K¯2,1
1×(k−1)
K¯2,2
1×1
 . (15)
e posterior distribution of Z given the observations ∆Y
in (13) can be obtained using (7) as Gaussian with mean and
variance given by
µZ = µ¯2 + K¯2,1
(
K¯1,1 + 2ν2I
)−1 (∆Y − µ¯1) ,
σ 2Z = K¯2,2 − K¯2,1
(
K¯1,1 + 2ν2I
)−1
K¯1,2,
(16)
where, we have used the fact that ∆y 〈k 〉

∆u〈k 〉
, being the dif-
ference of two Gaussian variables has variance 2ν2; see (11).
Given the mean and variance in (16), it can be shown that [23]
E [Z ]+ = µZ (1 − φ (−µZ /σZ ))+
σZ√
2pi
exp
(
−µ2Z /2σ 2Z
)
, (17)
where, φ is the standard Gaussian distribution.
3
Algorithm 1 summarizes the Bayesian optimization approach
to compute Nash equilibria in nite potential games.
Algorithm 1 Bayesian algorithm to compute Nash equilib-
rium in nite potential games
1: Choose random initial action x0.
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . : do
3: Construct Xk−1FIP =
{
x :
(
x−i = xk−1−i
)
&
(
xi , xk−1i
)}
.
4: Compute ∆Y according to (13).
5: for x ∈ Xk−1FIP do
6: Compute mean and covariance of Z using the par-
titions from (15) according to (16).
7: Compute E [Z ]+ according to (17).
8: end for
9: Choose xk = argmax
x ∈X k−1FIP
E [Z ]+
10: end for
4 NASH EQUILIBRIA FOR INFINITE
POTENTIAL GAMES
is section considers potential games with continuous action
sets. When action sets are continuous, the potential function
of the game is related to the utility function of the players
through the derivative as in (5). Similar to nite potential
games, we propose generating a path. Let
(
x1,x2, · · · ,xk−1
)
be the current state of the path. Let the next action in the path
be xk =
(
y,xk−1−i
)
. We propose to update y as below:
y = xk−1i + δi
∂Φ
∂xi

x=xk−1
. (18)
e gradient algorithm in (18) requires the following: (i) esti-
mating the gradient ∂Φ∂xi , (ii) choosing appropriate step-size
δi , and, (iii) choosing the player i to update. We deal with
each of these steps in turn in Sec. 4.1, Sec. 4.2, and Sec. 4.3,
respectively.
4.1 Estimating the potential gradient
Let, xk =
(
y,xk−1−i
)
and ∆uki = u
k
i − uk−1i , where i is the
unique deviator from k − 1 to k . Consider the path:
rk (τ ) = xk−1 + τ
(
xk − xk−1
)
τ ∈ [0, 1] . (19)
en, ∫
rk (τ )
∂Φ
∂τ
dτ = Φ(xk ) − Φ(xk−1) = ∆uki , (20)
where the rst equality in (20) follows from the fact that the
line integral of a scalar eld, such as the potential, depends
only on the end points. e second equality in (20) follows
from the denition of the potential games in (3). e integral
in (20) can be re-wrien as follows:∫
rk (τ )
∂Φ
∂τ
dτ =
∫ 1
0
∑
j
∂Φ
∂r j
dr j
dτ
dτ =
∫ 1
0
∑
j
∂Φ
∂r j
(
xkj − xk−1j
)
dτ
=
∫ 1
0
∂Φ
∂ri
(
xki − xk−1i
)
dτ =
(
xki − xk−1i
) ∫ 1
0
∂Φ
∂xi
dτ , (21)
where the rst equality is obtained by ‘total derivative’ formu-
lae, and the last equality is due to i being the unique deviator
from xk−1 to xk . Hence, from (20) and (21), the change in
utility ∆uki can be interpreted as integral observations of the
dierential of the potential along the xi direction.
Dene,
Λ = diag (∆x<1> ,∆x<2> , · · · ,∆x<k−1>) ,
φ∂ =
(
∂Φ
∂x<1>
,
∂Φ
∂x<2>
, · · · ∂Φ
∂x<k−1>
)
.
(22)
Using the vectors in (22), along the path, (21) can be wrien
in vector notation as
∆U = Λ
(∫
 φ∂
)
,
where, ∆U is as in (13) and  is the Hadamard (point-wise)
product. ∆U is a Gaussian process since it is obtained by linear
operators on the gradient of the potential function which is a
Gaussian process. Let the potential gradient vector be denoted
by Φ∂ =
(
∂Φ
∂x1
, ∂Φ∂x2
, · · · ∂Φ∂xI
)
. e joint Gaussian process can
be shown to be equal to(
Φ∂
∆U
)
∼ GP
((
µD
µ∆U
)
,
(
κ(D,D) γT
γ pi
))
, (23)
where,
µ∆Uk = ∆x 〈k 〉
∫
µD〈k 〉
(
rk (τ )
)
dτ
γk,i (x) = ∆x 〈k 〉
∫ 1
0
κ
(D,D)
〈k 〉,i
(
rk (τ ),x
)
dτ (24)
pik,l = ∆x 〈k 〉∆x 〈l 〉
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
κ
(D,D)
〈k 〉, 〈l 〉
(
rk (τ ), r l (τ¯ )
)
dτ dτ¯ ,
where, rk (τ ) is the path in (19), ∆x 〈k 〉 is as in (13), and µD and
κ(D,D) are the mean and covariance function of the Gaussian
process Φ∂ described in Sec. 2.2.
e posterior distribution process of the potential gradient
can be obtained using (7) as
µD

∆Y
= µD + γᵀ
(
pi + 2ν2I
)−1 (
∆u − µ∆U
)
,
κ(D,D)

∆Y
= κ(D,D) − γᵀ
(
pi + 2ν2I
)−1
γ ,
(25)
where, ∆Y is as in (13) and we have again used the fact that
∆y 〈k 〉

∆u〈k 〉
, being the dierence of two Gaussian variables,
has variance 2ν2. Having estimated the potential gradient, the
next section considers the problem of selecting the step size.
4
4.2 Choosing the step size
e ideal step size for a gradient algorithm such as the one
in (18) is given by the second derivative (or the Hessian). How-
ever, obtaining the second derivatives is computationally tax-
ing. Hence, a practical strategy is to perform a line search.
A line search algorithm tries a sequence of candidate value
of step size, and stops to accept one of the candidate values
when the conditions are ‘acceptable’. A popular method of
line search is given by the backtracing algorithm. e key
idea of backtracing is to start with a maximum step size, i.e.
δ0 = δmax and then iteratively generate step sizes as follows:
δm = βδm−1, β ∈ (0, 1) being the backtracing parameter, until
an ‘acceptable’ step size is found. e following conditions
popularly known as Wolfe conditions [22] provide step size
that ensures convergence of a gradient algorithm.
Definition 2 (Wolfe’s conditions). Given a function f and
an ascent direction p, i.e. pᵀ f ′(xk ) > 0, with 0 < c1 < c2 ≤ 1,
a step-size δ is acceptable if:
• Sucient Increase: f (xk+δp)−f (xk ) ≥ c1δ f ′(xk )ᵀp
• CurvatureCondition: c2 f ′(xk )ᵀp ≥ f ′(xk + δp)ᵀp
e rst condition ensures that there is ‘sucient’ increase
in function value in the direction p. e second condition
ensures that the slope of the function decreases. Typically the
values are chosen as: c1 = 1 × 10−4 and c2 = 0.8 [22]. In the
Bayesian optimization framework, [19] derives a probabilistic
approach to the Wolfe conditions. e key idea in [19] is to
compute the probability that the Wolfe conditions in Defn. 2
are satised and then only consider candidates that pass a
threshold, denoted by cw .
Computing the probability of Wolfe conditions: From
Defn. 2, computing the probability of Wolfe conditions require
modelling the function along with its derivatives. In addition,
we need to choose the ascent direction p. Choosing to update
player i in (18), we choose the ascent direction as below:
pi = sign
(
E
(
∂Φ
∂xi
))
ei , (26)
where, ei is the standard basis vector. e posterior distribu-
tion of ∂Φ/∂xi is obtained from (25) in Sec. 4.1.
Let the step size be δ . For player i , dene x¯k = xk + δpi , the
next possible action in the path, where the ascent direction pi
is given by (26). Let Φi be the vector of potential value at x¯k
and xk , i.e. Φi = Φ(x¯k ),Φ(xk )), and, Φ∂,i be the gradient of Φi
with respect to xi , i.e. Φ∂,i = (∂Φ(x¯k )/∂xi , ∂Φ(xk )/∂xi ). e
joint Gaussian process of Φi , Φ∂,i and the observations ∆U
in (13) can be shown to be equal to
©­«
Φi
Φ∂,i
∆U
ª®¬ ∼ GP ©­«©­«
µ
µD
µ∆U
ª®¬ , ©­«
κ κD ηT
κD κ(D,D) γT
η γ pi
ª®¬ª®¬ , (27)
where, µ∆U , γ and pi are as in (24). κD is the covariance be-
tween the observation and its derivative, see Sec. 2.2. Using
the kernel κD , η in (27) is
ηk = ∆x 〈k 〉
∫ 1
0
κD〈k 〉
(
rk (τ ),x
)
dτ , (28)
where, rk (τ ) is the path dened in (21). e posterior distri-
bution of
(
Φi ,Φ∂,i
)
∼ GP
(
µδ ,κδ
)
can be obtained similar
to (25), as follows
µδ

∆Y
=
(
µ
µD
)
+
(
η
γ
)ᵀ (
pi + 2ν2I
)−1 (
∆Y − µ∆U
)
,
κδ

∆Y
= κ(D,D) −
(
η
γ
)ᵀ (
pi + 2ν2I
)−1 (η
γ
)
,
(29)
Similar to (25), we have used the fact that ∆y 〈k 〉

∆u〈k 〉
, being
the dierence of two Gaussian variables, has variance 2ν2.
e Wolfe conditions in Defn. 2 in vector notation is as follows:(
ak
bk
)
=
(−c1 0 −1 1
0 0 c2 −1
) (
Φi
Φ∂,i
)
. (30)
en, ak and bk in (30) are jointly Gaussian. e probabil-
ity that the Wolfe conditions are satised is given by Pw =
P((ak ≥ 0)&(bk ≥ 0)). Several packages, such as the one
in [8], are available to compute this probability eciently.
4.3 Choosing the player to update
Section 4.1 considered the problem of estimating the gradient
of the potential function and Sec. 4.2 considered the problem
of selecting an ‘acceptable’ step size δi (probability of Wolfe
condition above the cw threshold), for each player i .
In this section, we consider the problem of choosing which
player to update. As in the nite potential games, we select the
player which provides the maximum ‘expected improvement’
in the one-step lookahead criterion (12), i.e.
i∗ = argmax
i
E
[
Φ(xk + δipi ) − Φ(xk )
]
+
(31)
It is straightforward to compute (31) using the posterior prob-
ability in (29) and the formulae in (17).
Algorithm 2 summarizes the various steps explained above to
compute the Nash equilibrium for innite potential games.
5 NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we apply the methods in Sec. 3 and Sec. 4 to
compute the Nash equilibrium of static potential games and
the linear Nash equilibrium of dynamic potential games. In
this numerical section, we will use the following choice of
mean and covariance function:
µ(x) = 0, κse = `2 exp
−
1
2
I∑
j=1
(
x j − x¯ j
)2
λ2j
 , (32)
where, the hyperparameters λj , known as the input scale
length, determines the relevance of each dimension. e hy-
perparameter ` controls the magnitude of the output. Seing
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Algorithm 2 Bayesian algorithm to compute Nash equilibria
in innite potential games
Require: Line search parameters c1 and c2, Maximum step
size δmax, Wolfe probability threshold cw ,
1: Choose random initial action x0.
2: for k = 1, 2, . . . : do
3: Estimate gradients using (25).
4: for player i = 1, 2, · · · ,n do
5: Choose ascent direction pi using (26).
6: δi = δmax.
7: repeat
8: Compute Wolfe probability Pw using (29)–(30).
9: Reduce step size δi = βδi
10: until { Pw ≥ cw }
11: end for
12: Choose player i∗ according to (31).
13: Update xk according to (18) with step-size δi∗
14: end for
the mean function to zero is motivated by the ordinal nature3
of the utility function of the players (and, hence the potential
function). e choice of the squared exponential kernel κse is
motivated by (i) Lemma 1 requires that the potential function
be continuously dierentiable, (ii) existence of analytical ex-
pressions for the kernels in (8) and (9). In particular, for the
squared exponential kernel:
κ
(D)
i = κse
(
(x − x¯)i
λ2i
)
,
κ
(D,D)
i, j = κse
(
δi, j
λ2i
+
(x − x¯)i (x¯ − x)j
λ2i λ
2
j
)
,
where, δi, j is the Kronecker delta function.
5.1 Static Potential Games: Cournot
oligopoly
Cournot oligopoly is a market with I players for a single good,
where each player manufactures a certain quantity of good
given by qi . e price is dictated by the market and is a
function of the total quantity produced by all the players,
given by p = a − bQ , where Q = ∑i qi and a,b > 0. Each
player has a cost function given by ci (qi ), a function of the
quantity produced by each player. e Cournot oligopoly is
known to be a potential game [20].
To illustrate the main results, we consider a version of the
problem with 2 players, with the following parameters:
ci (qi ) = diqi βi ui = qip − ci (qi ) i = 1, 2 βi ∈ (0, 2) ,
a = 10, b = 1, di = 5, β1 = 0.95, β2 = 1.95, (33)
where, we have used the exponential cost function for the
players in (33). e parameter βi characterizes the rate of
growth of cost [37]. e rst player models an agent with low
3An ordinal utility function is unique up to increasing monotone transformation.
For example, adding a positive constant term to the utility function of the players
does not change the solution in (1).
rate of cost growth (β1 < 1) i.e. the agent prots from more
production. However, the second player models an agent with
high rate of cost growth (β2 > 1), i.e. the payo decreases with
more production. Each agent sells quantity qi at price p. e
utility of the player is the prot given in (33).
As can be seen that the price goes to zero whenQ = 10. Hence,
we restrict our search space from (0, 10]. Due to the nature of
the cost function in (33), straight-forward analytic methods
cannot be used for computing the Nash equilibrium, even for
the case of a 2 player game.
Finite Game Formulation: e action space of the Cournot
problem is continuous. To apply the nite game formulation
in Sec. 3, we discretize the action space into a 31 × 31 grid.
Algorithm 1 is run with the following parameters:
λ2i =
√
30, ` = 1. (34)
Algorithm 1 is terminated when the one-step lookahead crite-
rion in (12) is less than 5 × 10−2.
First, we compare Algorithm 1 with GPGame [25], which
can used for ‘black box’ utility functions of general games.
GPGame requires an initial set of ‘space lling’ measurements.
As suggested in [25], we set the number of initial measure-
ments to be 11. To enable comparison, we initialized Algo-
rithm 1 with the same initial conditions. Table 1 compares the
number of iterations required by Algorithm 1 and GPGame.
In Table 1, we used ‘Probability of Nash Equilibrium’ dened
in [25] as the criterion for GPGame. Algorithm 1 performs bet-
ter than GPGame in this setup. Algorithm 1 utilizes the struc-
ture of the potential game, i.e. the optimization of the poten-
tial function leads to Nash equilibrium. In addition, GPGame
requires estimating I negative quadrant probabilities of multi-
variate Gaussians of size |Xi |, which is computationally ex-
pensive. In comparison, estimating the one-step lookahead
criterion in (12) is analytic (refer to (17)).
Finally, we also compute the equilibrium through the expo-
nential weight algorithm, under the no-regret learning frame-
work. e exponential weights algorithm is shown to work
in potential games, even when only the measurements of the
utility function are available, using the bandit estimator de-
ned in [11]. However, due to the absence of a central agent
(system operator), the exponential weights algorithm diers
from the seing considered in this paper; see Figure 1. Table 1
shows the comparison of the number of iterations between
Algorithm 1 and the exponential weight algorithm in [11]. In
comparison to the exponential weight algorithm, Algorithm 1
requires only a fraction of the number of iterations. However,
the exponential weight algorithm has the advantage that it is
fully distributed.
Innite Game Formulation: e experiment was repeated
with the formulation of continuous action sets in Sec. 4. To
run Algorithm 2, the following parameters were chosen:
c1 = 1 × 10−4, c2 = 0.8, cw = 0.3, λ2i =
√
30,
` = 1, δmax = 1, β = 0.75
(35)
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Algorithm # Iterations
Algorithm 1 2-3
GPGame [11] 4-5
Exponential weight [11] 200
Table 1: Comparison between the number of iterations between the
various algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in nite potential
games. In Algorithm 1 and GPGame, the number of initial ‘space ll-
ing’ measurements was set to 11. Algorithm 1 performs better than
GPGame, and uses only a fraction of iterations compared to a com-
pletely distributed algorithm like the exponential weight algorithm.
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Figure 2: Convergence of Algorithm 2 for the Cournot oligopoly
problem in (33). e path taken by the algorithm is shown in red. e
path is superimposed on the contour plot of the potential function (un-
known to Algorithm 2). It is easy to see that Algorithm 2 converges to
the optimal solution. It can be noticed (from inset) that the algorithm
initially selects larger step sizes as it explores the search space followed
by smaller step sizes as it exploits the available information to reach the
global optimum.
Figure 2 shows the convergence of the Algorithm 2. e algo-
rithm is terminated when the one-step lookahead criterion less
than 1 × 10−4. e potential function for the Cournot example
is analytic and is given in [20]. In Figure 2, we also plot the
contour plot of the potential function. From the inset in Fig. 2
it is easy to see that the algorithm converges to the optimal
solution. Also, notice that the algorithm initially selects larger
step sizes as it explores the search space followed by smaller
step sizes as it exploits the available information to reach the
global optimum, a property of the one-step lookahead crite-
rion in (31). e GPGame algorithm in [25] cannot be used
when the action sets are continuous4.
4We expect to extend some of the ideas in this paper to handle continuous action
sets in GPGame.
To further illustrate the eciency of Algorithm 2, we compared
Algorithm 2 with a non-linear optimizer. For the non-linear
optimizer, we used BOBYQA5 [26], an algorithm that uses a
quadratic approximation of the objective function. e poten-
tial function for the Cournot example is given in [20]. Table 2
shows the comparison of the number of iterations averaged
over 10 independent runs with varying start points. Both the
non-linear optimizer and Algorithm 2 were provided with the
same start points. Algorithm 2 is able to achieve similar per-
formance to a non-linear optimizer with full knowledge of the
objective (the potential function).
Table 2: Comparison between the number of iterations of Algo-
rithm 2 with a non-linear optimizer. Algorithm 2 is able to achieve sim-
ilar performance to a non-linear optimizer with full knowledge of the
potential function.
Algorithm # Iterations
Non-linear optimizer 9
(BOBYQA [26])
Algorithm 2 12
5.2 Potential Dierential Games:
Computing Linear Nash equilibrium
In Section 5.1, we illustrated the advantage of Bayesian opti-
mization approach to static potential games. In this section,
we consider dynamic potential games, in particular, dynamic
potential games evolving in continuous times, referred to as
dierential games6. Dierential games model a wide variety of
interactions in economics, nance, sociology and biology; see
for example [2]. In static potential games several techniques
exist to nd the potential function given the utility functions
of the players. However, in dierential potential games, and in
general for dynamic games, computing the potential function
is non-trivial, even with the knowledge of the utility function.
To illustrate the main results, we consider the following classi-
cal dierential game of a common pool of resource exploited
by heterogeneous players [34]:
Ûs(t) = as(t) −
∑
i
xi (t), a ≥ 0
s(0) = s0.
(36)
e state s in (36) represents the stock of the resource anda > 0
implies that the resource is renewable such as in shing or
logging in forestry. e utility of player i when the game is
played for a horizon of time T is given by:
Ji (xi ,x−i ) =
∫ T
0
ui (s(t),x(t)) exp (−θi t) dt , θi ≥ a (37)
where, x(t) = (x1(t),x2(t), · · · ,xI (t)) is the action of all the
players at time t and ui (·) is the instantaneous utility of each
player as a function of the state and the action of all the players.
e parameter θi represents the discount rate of player i . e
5BOBYQA performed the best among all the non-linear optimizers we tried.
6Similar techniques also apply to discrete time dynamic potential games.
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Nash equilibrium for a dierential game is dened similarly
to (2) as:
x∗i = argmin
xi
Ji (xi ,x∗−i ) ∀i . (38)
In the following, as a special case, we consider the following
instantaneous utility function:
ui (s(t),x(t)) = (xi (t))αi , αi > 0 (39)
e parameter αi in (39) captures the classical economic no-
tion of ‘returns to scale’, i.e. the rate of increase in payo (or
utility) relative to investment (the action, in this case) . In-
dustries such as mining have an increasing returns to scale
(αi > 1), while computer technology have a decreasing returns
to scale (αi ≤ 1). e structure of (39) ensures that (36) is a
potential game. e above model also describe dynamics of
single capital stock [7] and optimal dynamic scheduling for a
common resource [1].
Linear Control Strategies: In this paper, we focus on lin-
ear strategies, i.e. strategies of the form xi (t) = γis(t). e
focus on linear strategies is primarily motivated by simplic-
ity. In addition, linear strategies are known to be optimal
when the state transition in (36) is linear in state and actions
and the instantaneous objective function is homogeneous like
in (39) [33]. However, the focus on linear strategies precludes
some non-linear Nash control strategies.
Simulation Setup and Results: To illustrate the main re-
sults, we consider a version of the problem in (36) with 2 play-
ers, with the following parameters:
a = 0.9, s0 = 1, α1 = 0.3, α2 = 0.2,
θ1 = θ2 = 0.95, T = 4.
(40)
Adopting the linear strategy, the potential function is parame-
terized by γ1 and γ2. For the linear strategy, the state evolution
is exponential with parameter a −∑i γi . e utilities in (37)
were computed using numerical integration with 1 × 104 in-
tegration points. Algorithm 2 was run with the parameters
given in (35), except for the hyperparameters λj =
√
7. Fig-
ure 3 shows the trajectory of the state and the linear strategy
(actions of the players) aer 18 iterations of Algorithm 2. e
‘true’ Nash equilibrium for the problem in (36) can be com-
puted using the methodology outlined in [34]. From Fig. 3, it
can be observed that the strategy computed from Algorithm 2
is ‘close’ to the Nash equilibrium.
5.3 Discussion
In Sec. 5.1 and Sec. 5.2, we illustrated the advantage of Bayesian
optimization approach to computing Nash equilibria of ‘black
box’ potential games. Even in the absence of knowledge of
the utility function, the Nash equilibrium can be computed
quite eciently. However, this eciency comes at a price.
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 require inverting a K × K ma-
trix, which requires O(K3) computations. Sparse Gaussian
process techniques [27] reduce the number of computations
to O(m2K), wherem  K . In addition, Algorithm 2, requires
computing the integrals in (24) and (28). For the squared ex-
ponential kernel in (32), the η and γ integrands are analytic
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Figure 3: Comparison of the state and the linear control strategy ob-
tained by Algorithm 2 against Nash equilibrium.
and expressions can be found in [12]. However, computing pi
in (24) requires numerical integration. is could be computa-
tionally expensive as the number of players increase.
6 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we considered potential games with ‘black box
utility’ functions. Using the Gaussian process framework and
structure of potential games, we derived two novel algorithms;
one for discrete action sets, and one for action sets with real in-
tervals. We illustrated the eciency of the algorithms, in terms
of black box evaluations, for computing the Nash equilibrium
of static games and the linear Nash equilibria of dierential
games. In addition, the algorithms provide a general non-
parametric technique to compute Nash equilibria of potential
games, without explicitly computing the potential function.
Extensions of the current work could involve developing al-
gorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of population
games, investigating sparse Gaussian process for reducing the
computational complexity and computing closed loop Nash
equilibrium of dynamic potential games. ese issues promise
to oer interesting avenues for future work.
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